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Recent studies have shown that barriers to entry for large retail establishments in Spain have been in-
creased in the last decade. Using information on local markets, we test whether the entry of large re-
tail establishments was effectively limited by regional regulation and whether it effectively protected
in-town shops from competition. We find that if entry barriers were reduced to their average level in
1997, the number of large retail establishments would increase by 11.7%. We also find that over-regu-
lation in 1997 has improved in-town shops’ market position, with their number increasing by 13.8%.
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1. Introduction
A study carried out by the Banco de España in 2007 showed that barriers to entry for
large retail establishments promoted by Spain’s autonomous regions have been increased
over the last decade.1 Only a few years prior to that study, the Comisión Nacional de la Com-
petencia 2 had warned, in 2003, that regional barriers to entry for large retail establishments
had “lowered competition… allowing incumbent firms to be less efficient, which has trans-
lated into higher prices” (CNC, 2003, p. 22). This contrasts with the European Single Mar-
ket Program initiative that was launched more than two decades ago to deregulate markets
and lower trade barriers (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Chen, 2004) and with the European
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Union’s Services Directive (Directive 2006/123/EC) that aims to facilitate the freedom of es-
tablishment for providers in the Internal Market. 3
Why have regions decided to create entry barriers against large retail establishments?
Why have they then imposed additional barriers to the initial ones? As pointed out by the
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia in a 1995 report, “the objective of the [Spanish law
that regulates the retail sector] is to protect traditional shops with the aim of slowing down
the continuous decline in their market share […]. In addition, slowing down the creation of
large retail establishments will reinforce the incumbents’ market power, as they will not
compete with new rivals. In contrast, if the entry of large retail establishments was not lim-
ited, retail competition would increase, and supply would thus be higher, with more variety
and better prices”.
Using an asymmetric model of oligopoly, Hoffmaister (2010) has shown that forcing
(low-cost) large retail establishments out of the market changes the composition of the retail
industry in favor of traditional shops. In the absence of barriers, (low-cost) large retailers
drive prices below the traditional retailers’ long-run break-even point thereby forcing the lat-
ter out of the market. To the extent that these shops are locally owned and operated, region-
al governments may thus be seeking to protect and enhance employment in these business-
es as well as to shore up electoral constituencies.
Entry barriers may have a direct positive effect on retail prices if, as pointed out by the
Comisión Nacional de la Competencia, incumbent firms are less efficient due to the lower
competition pressure they face compared to a situation with no entry barriers. In this sense,
indirect empirical evidence suggests that restricting the entry of large retail establishments
might increase prices and markups 4. Direct evidence is provided by Hoffmaister (2010) and
Matea and Mora (2009) who analyzed the effect of barriers to entry on prices using a data
set derived from an exhaustive study of Spanish regional competition policies. Hoffmaister
(2010) took into account possible threshold effects that might characterize the effect of bar-
riers on prices. He found that imposing a second or third barrier does not further increase
prices, a result which is consistent with a signaling effect of establishing entry barriers, i.e.
imposing a single barrier would seem to send a clear protectionist message. 5
However, an additional channel through which barriers may affect prices in the retail
market is through the number of competitors. Since the legal retail entry barriers in Spain are
mainly designed to limit the entry of large retail establishments, they are likely to have ef-
fectively deterred the creation of new hypermarkets and shopping centers. 6 If there is a re-
lationship between market structure and prices in this industry, the effect on prices is likely
to be non-negligible. In this sense, Griffith and Harmgart (2008) have recently found that re-
strictive planning regulation is associated with a small but significantly higher food prices,
and leads to a loss to consumers of up to £10m per annum.
Many papers have found a positive relationship between changes in concentration and
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increase in market concentration in local food retailing markets in Chile yields an increase
in food prices of 0.05%. Pita, Brito and Lucena (2003) provide an empirical application to
the Portuguese food retailing market and found that the price set by each firm depends
positively on the degree of local market concentration. In the US, Cotterill (1986) and
Newmark (1990) reached contradictory conclusions regarding this relation. Asplund and
Friberg (2002) concluded that the relation between market structure variables and food
prices in Sweden is of the expected sign but relatively weak. Similarly, Marion and Mazo
(1998) found evidence of a positive relationship between changes in concentration and
changes in the price indexes for food-at-home. In a recent study, Manuszak and Moul
(2008) analyzed the relationship between prices and market structure for office supply su-
perstores in the US, using a two-stage approach to avoid potential biases due to the endo-
geneity of market structure. They found a strong negative relationship between prices and
market structure variables.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that entry might have a notable effect on prices
in local markets. For instance, the time paths of prices of three hypermarkets and the
national average price are shown in Figure 1. These hypermarkets faced the entry of an
important competitor in their local markets: Eroski opened a large establishment in
Logroño in 2003, Carrefour opened an establishment in Vigo in 2003, and a new large
establishment was opened in Malaga in 2005. 7 It is first worth noting that in 2001 the
prices of these hypermarkets were similar to the national average. However, their
prices dropped drastically after the entry of a new large establishment in their local
markets (that is, since 2003 and 2005). This seems to indicate that restricting entry in
local retail markets may harm consumers’ welfare as they are paying higher prices for
the products they purchase from nearby hypermarkets than those they would pay with
free entry.8
Figure 1. Effect of new entry on large retail establisment’s prices.52 LUIS OREA
In the present paper we try to test two of the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia’s
statements in its 1995 competition report, namely, whether the entry of large retail establish-
ments was effectively limited by regional regulation, and whether regional regulation effec-
tively protected traditional shops from competition and improved their market share. As far
as we know, this is the first attempt to assess the impact of restrictive regulation on entry into
the Spanish retail industry. To achieve this objective, we estimate a reduced form model
where the number of retail establishments in a particular local market is modeled as a func-
tion of a measure of regional barriers to entry as well as demand and cost drivers.
A more sophisticated version of this model, which has its roots in the model introduced
by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), has recently been estimated by Griffith and Harmgart (2008)
for the UK grocery retail industry. They found that more restrictive planning regulation re-
duces the number of large retail establishments. They also found that the impact might be
overestimated if the variation in demographic characteristics across markets (i.e. market het-
erogeneity) is not controlled for.
In order to control for market heterogeneity and aggregation errors that might bias our
empirical results, in the present study we use a local market approach. Previous studies and
reports on the Spanish retail market used a regional approach where geographical markets
were broadly defined as a whole administrative region. Following Manuszak and Moul
(2008), Gómez-Lobo and González (2007), and Ashenfelter et. al. (2004), our geographical
markets are commercial areas, where each commercial area comprises the municipality of
one of the main Spanish cities and its surrounding municipalities.
The empirical evidence in this study exploits the synthetic indictor of regional retail reg-
ulation recently constructed by Matea and Mora (2009), and a unique dataset derived from
an extensive analysis of the location of each large retail establishments in Spain. This allows
us to measure the distance between stores and to identify those stores which are competing
directly with other stores in the same commercial area.
2. Empirical Model
The basic model to be estimated relies on a theoretical model where entry is thought of
as a two-stage process: a firm incurs an entry cost, which includes the cost of barriers to
entry, and then competes for business.
Following Manuszak and Moul (2008) the latent profit function for a particular entrant
into a market m can be written as:
(1)
where Zm are demand and cost market-specific factors that impact on profitability in a geo-
graphical market m located in a particular region R; Nm is the total number of large retail es-
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tablishments after entry; FR, which is the most relevant variable, tries to capture the effect of
regional legal barriers to entry; vm is a noise term that captures unobserved factors in market
m that impact on entrants’ profits in market m; and ʸ = (α,ʴ,β) are unknown parameters of
the latent profit function. In this model, barriers are viewed as a fixed cost (similar to an an-
nual licensing fee) that shifts the establishment’s average cost structure. We assume in the
latent profit function (1) that firms’ profits are decreasing in Nm, so that (1) can be interpret-
ed as the reduced form of the expected present discounted value of profits that result from
post-entry competition between firms and which all firms observe.
In the second stage, a firm enters whenever profits cover its entry cost. 9 The resulting
number of retail competitors supplying the market in the long run can be obtained from the
zero-profit condition. Assuming that all retail outlets are identical, the equilibrium number
of firms in market m is characterized by the following equation:
(2)
Rearranging (2), the endogenous number of firms in market m in the long run can be
written as:
(3)
where ʴ’=ʴ/β, α’ =α/β, and em = vm/β. This is the basic model to be estimated. This model
is also a reduced-form model in the sense that its parameters are themselves functions of the
structural parameters of the underlying economic relationship that determines the market
structure (see Baker and Rubinfeld, 1999). Thus, equation (3) suggests that the profit-maxi-
mizing behavior and entry decision imply that barriers reduce the number of firms in the
market. Once the effect of regional entry barriers is estimated, it is possible to estimate how
the number of stores would change if entry barriers were eliminated. 10
Instead of estimating a simple equation of market structure such as (3), several papers
have estimated an ordered probit specification of (3) where the probability that a local mar-
ket is supplied by a particular number of firms is modeled. This approach was first used by
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) in order to model the market structure in five different service
and retail industries using data on the number of firms and population for a cross-section of
geographic markets. Although they used a different functional form for the latent profit func-
tion, they found that there was a positive correlation between the number of firms and the
population per firm over the range of approximately one to three firms in the market. They
developed the insight that if the entry of additional firms into a market compresses the aver-
age markup of all firms in operation, then the market size needed to support an additional
firm will be larger than if this competitive effect were absent. 11 Mazzeo (2002b) used this
approach to model the number of motels located along U.S. interstate highways using data
from a cross-section of local markets. Manuszak and Moul (2008) applied the same model
in order to analyze the market structure for office supply superstores in the US, and Griffith
and Harmgart (2008) did the same for the UK grocery retail industry.
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We do not directly use Bresnahan and Reiss’ approach, which entails estimating the
probability that a local market is supplied by a particular number of firms, because the num-
bers of retail establishments in our local markets are much larger than the number of com-
petitors in the aforementioned studies. Instead, we propose directly estimating the number of
firms in a particular market as a function of entrants’ profit determinants. If the effect on la-
tent profits of the number of firms is roughly linear, we expect to get similar results to those
obtained using an ordered probit model because both models are basically based on the same
covariates (i.e., those that affect entrants’ latent profits) and stochastic assumptions (e.g. nor-
mality). Hence, we can obtain reliable parameter estimates by using either the maximum
likelihood techniques used in a typically ordered probit model or by using least squares,
which is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood. 12
In order to test our two main hypotheses, we estimate equation (3) for two types of
stores: i) small in-town supermarkets and other traditional specialized stores, such as bak-
eries, butchers, grocers, clotheswear shops, shoe shops, etc.; and ii) large, often out-of-
town, hypermarkets and shopping centers, where the consumer spends the greatest week-
ly amount. The dominant model of consumer behavior in the retail market considers that
consumers acquire the bulk of their demand in a one-stop shopping trip in large establish-
ments; they subsequently top-up with additional items that were forgotten or unexpected-
ly needed in small stores and traditional shops.13 Different store formats arise because of
consumer preferences and shopping habits. For the one-stop shopping trip consumers pre-
fer a large variety of different goods and therefore prefer a large store format. For the top-
up shopping, on the other hand, a small convenient store that is in close proximity is pre-
ferred. For this reason the EC views these stores as complements rather than substitute
formats. 14
We distinguish between these two types of stores because they were affected different-
ly by regional regulation. Based on the one-stop vs. top-up model of shopping behavior, we
assume in our estimations that firms make decisions about entry into the large store format
independently of the number of small and traditional stores, whereas the decision to enter
into the small store format takes the number of large stores as given. 15
3. Regional barriers to retail competition in Spain 16
To measure the effect of entry barriers on the number of firms and, indirectly, on retail
prices it is necessary to measure the level of entry barriers. In their 2003 report the Comisión
Nacional de la Competencia identified seven barriers to retail competition at the regional
level: 1) defining a large retail firm based on its location; 2) establishing multiple criteria to
determine whether a firm is large; 3) defining a firm to be large when at least 25 percent is
owned by a large firm; 4) establishing idiosyncratic requirements to license discount stores;
5) restricting the expansion or a change of a firm’s ownership; 6) requiring financial viabil-
ity plans to license commercial establishments; and 7) imposing outright bans on large retail
outlets. These barriers protect incumbent retail establishments from potential competition55 The effect of legal barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a local market approach
from large retail establishments by either increasing the cost of operating in a particular re-
gion or extending these costs to a broader range of firms.
Using the simple sum of the number of barriers identified by the Spanish Competition
Authority, we show the level of entry barriers in each region in Table 1. 17 The dispersion of
barriers to entry across Spain’s autonomous regions is large, reflecting the high degree of re-
gional autonomy in raising barriers to entry. Although all barriers have been employed by
Spain’s regions, the two most commonly used are those defining a large firm based on its lo-
cation and outright bans. Both have been present in more than half of the regions during the
sample period, 1996–2005.
Table 1
LEGAL BARRIERS RETAIL DISTRIBUTION BY REGION, 1996-2005
Location Multiple Idiosyn- Restiction
definition criteria Ownership cratic in the Financial Outright
of large to define definition transfer viability

















Navarra ×× × ×
País Vasco ××× ×
Source: Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (2003) and Hoffmaister (2010).
Note: The symbol “x” denotes whether a specific region has imposed the barrier type listed in the column header
at some time during the period 1996–2005.
The definition of “large retail establishment” is important because this kind of estab-
lishment needs to apply for a second license from the autonomous regional government in
addition to the required municipal license. The definition of large retail establishments has
varied across regions and has changed over time. A number of regions –including Aragón,
Castilla-León, Cataluña, Galicia, La Rioja, Navarra, and Valencia– have employed loca-
tion-based restrictions since the mid-1990s, and these have remained in place through to the
end of 2005.56 LUIS OREA
Most of the autonomous regions have at some point established outright bans that for-
bid opening large retail establishments in a particular region during a period of time. With
the exception of Baleares and Cataluña, however, outright bans are a more recent phenome-
non, mainly being introduced since 2001. Nowadays, only the Canary Islands and Baleares
maintain outright bans for large establishments (see Matea and Mora, 2009, Table 7). Idio-
syncratic license licensing requirements for discount stores have also been used in a number
of regions since the late 1990s.
Matea and Mora (2009) have constructed synthetic indicators of retail market regulation
using factorial analysis incorporating, among others, all the legal restrictions highlighted by
the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia in their 2003 report. In Table 2 we reproduce their
second figure, which includes the calculated values of the synthetic indictor of retail regula-
tion for each autonomous region.
Table 2
RETAIL MARKET REGULATION LEVEL BY REGION
Region 1997 2007 Rate of growth (%)
Andalucía 35.3 50.7 43.8
Aragón 40.2 55.2 37.1
Baleares 43.5 52.4 20.5
Canarias 43.5 53.2 22.4
Cantabria 33.2 45.4 36.9
Castilla-La Mancha 33.0 40.0 21.4
Castilla León 37.6 48.8 30.0
Cataluña 42.2 53.7 27.3
Valencia 44.8 42.2 -5.9
Extremadura 33.0 54.9 66.5
Galicia 39.9 33.3 -16.7
Madrid 31.9 40.3 26.2
Murcia 35.3 50.1 42.0
Navarra 38.2 50.2 31.3
Asturias 35.5 61.8 74.2
Rioja (La) 39.3 37.0 -5.8
Source: Matea and Mora (2009).
Note: They do not provide the score for País Vasco as its inclusion worsened the factorial analy-
sis and significantly changed the other scores. Here the regulation scores are expressed in 100
units, while in Matea and Mora (2009) they are expressed in 10 units.
Using this indicator they found that, in contrast to international developments, retail
trade has become increasingly regulated in Spain. Indeed, most Spanish regions have im-
posed at least one barrier since 1996. The rising trend in regional barriers to retail competi-
tion contradicts the falling trend in international trade barriers among European countries.
The differences in retail regulation among autonomous regions have also increased, i.e. re-
gions that were relatively friendly to retail trade at the outset, such as Asturias and Ex-
tremadura, have caught up with the more restrictive practices in other regions. Hence, there
are important differences in the temporal evolution of the retail regulation among au-
tonomous regions.57 The effect of legal barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a local market approach
4. The market
To measure the effect of entry barriers on the number of large retail establishments we
need to define the relevant product and geographical market.
Since legal barriers to entry are more restrictive for large retail establishment than for
medium establishments (i.e. supermarkets) and small and specialized stores (like bakeries,
butchers, grocers, clotheswear shops, shoe shops, etc.), we will mainly focus our analysis on
hypermarkets or shopping centers. The Spanish Shopping Center Association defines shop-
ping centers as commercial units of relevant size, with a selling area usually not less than
1,500 m2 and formed by several individual stores that do not belong to the same brand but
which share a common image and a common management. Most of the shopping centers are
formed by hypermarkets, i.e. stores with an aggregate selling area not inferior to 2,500 m2
belonging to a brand where a broad range of products can be acquired through one-stop
shopping.
A more critical issue for our analysis is defining the geographical arena in which the
large retail establishments compete with each other. In some merger cases in the retail dis-
tribution sector the EC has carried out the analysis at the national level, based mainly on the
fact that most of the strategic decisions (e.g. advertising campaigns, bargaining with suppli-
ers/producers, client fidelization strategies and selection of the range of products sold) were
made at the national level. Overlapping in the catchment area of the stores also favors the
nationwide approach.
However, the EC decisions state that the coverage area of a given sales location (super-
market or hypermarket) is limited: 10 to 30 driving minutes are generally mentioned as the
radius of coverage of a given store (although this radius may be up to 60 km for the larger
stores. 18 On the other hand, several studies have previously established a relationship be-
tween prices and concentration in the retailing sector. The fact that local concentration af-
fects prices in many price-concentration studies is an argument in favor of a local market
analysis rather than a nation-wide approach when assessing the impact of entry barriers on
the number of firms.
Most of the shopping centers in Spain are located in or around the main Spanish cities.
Most of these cities are the capital of one of the 50 Spanish provinces. For a hypermarket or
a shopping center, the boundaries of their market do not coincide with the boundaries of the
municipalities where they are located. The reason is that in urban areas many people com-
mute daily from their town of residence, enlarging the geographical market in which con-
sumers shop. 19
Given these considerations, our local markets are defined as the commercial areas
formed by the municipality of one of the main Spanish cities and its surrounding municipal-
ities. 20 On the other hand, it is important to note that these commercial areas can be viewed
roughly as independent commercial markets due to the fact that the main Spanish cities58 LUIS OREA
(which form the main or “lead” municipality of the commercial areas) are, in general, quite
far away from each other with no other significant towns located between them.
To measure the number of large retail establishments in each of these commercial areas,
we follow the radius (or isochrones) approach used by the competition authorities, and as-
sume that a given store in the lead municipality of a commercial area competes directly with
all other stores in the same location, and other stores in locations which, using the fastest road,
are less than 30 kms away from the lead commercial area. Since the Competition authorities
mention that the radius may be up to 60 km for the larger stores and stores bordered by large
rural areas, we also carry out our estimations with a broader definition of the geographical
market by adding other stores which are a little farther than 30 kms from the main city. 21
5. Data set
As mentioned above we explain market structure variation using demand and cost driv-
ers to capture differences across commercial areas where retail outlets are located, in addi-
tion to an indicator of regional regulation. This section summarizes the data we use.
Most of the explanatory variables have been obtained from the Anuario Económico de
España 2008, a dataset elaborated by La Caixa, a Spanish savings bank. 22 This dataset in-
cludes demographic, economic and commercial information on all Spanish municipalities
with more than 1000 inhabitants in January 2007. More significantly, this database also in-
cludes several variables that have been elaborated with the aim of measuring the demand for
retail products in a particular municipality and in a particular commercial area. These com-
mercial areas were defined in turn using gravity models, based on commercial flows between
municipalities, and surveys filled in by the municipal authorities.
In our empirical application we analyze the determinants of retail market structure in 73
local markets, corresponding to the main commercial areas defined in the Anuario.We have
excluded three commercial areas belonging to the Basque Country because Matea and Mora
(2009) do not provide the regulation indicator for this region. For the same reason, Ceuta is
also excluded.
As is customary in this literature, we can use the population (in thousands) of the commer-
cial area, POPCA, to capture differences in demand size across local markets. However, given
that this variable does not account for differences in per capita purchasing power across com-
mercial areas, we also use a second demand variable, CONSUM, which captures the overall
consumption capacity of the population living in the commercial area. This variable is normal-
ized by the national level of population (expressed in units of 100,000 persons) and elaborated
using information about population, number of home telephones, vehicles, bank offices, etc.
Hence, the consumption capacity in a particular commercial area is measured not only as a
function of population but also as a function of several purchasing power proxy variables. We
expect a positive value for the parameters associated with POPCA and CONSUM.59 The effect of legal barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a local market approach
To capture possible differences in demand structure among local markets (i.e. demand
heterogeneity) we have included several variables. The first variable measures the propor-
tion of overall demand represented by the main municipality. Here we have two alterna-
tives: PROPOP if demand size is measured by population (POPCA), and PROCON if we
use consumption capacity (CONSUM). We expect a positive value for the parameters of
both these variables because hypermarkets and commercial centers are often located close
to the most important cities in order to minimize consumers’ driving costs, thereby increas-
ing consumers’ demand and their local market power. The second variable, DISTANCE, is
the distance from the lead municipality to the other municipalities of the commercial area.
This variable is constructed by averaging the distance from the lead municipality to all the
municipalities belonging to a particular commercial area using population as weights. Since
most large retail establishments are located in the main municipality and its surrounding
municipalities, consumers’ driving costs tend to be higher as the distance to the main mu-
nicipality increases. Hence, we expect a negative value for the parameter associated with
DISTANCE.
The number of competitors in a particular market depends on operating costs and
fixed entry costs. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and de Juan (2006) we model
these costs as a function of the characteristics of the local markets. To capture differ-
ences in retails costs across commercial areas, we have included three variables in our
estimations. The first is the occupation rate (in percentage terms) in the commercial
area, OCURATE. This variable is chosen as a proxy for labor wages and other labor ex-
penses, and is constructed as a weighted average of the occupation rates of all the mu-
nicipalities belonging to a particular commercial area. 23 Hence, we expect a negative ef-
fect of OCURATE on the number of retail outlets. It should be noted, however, that the
sign of this coefficient might be not statistically significant if OCURATE also captures
a demand effect.
The second cost variable is the population density (measured in inhabitants per km2) of
the main municipality and surrounding municipalities which are less than 30 kms away from
the lead municipality of the commercial area, POPDEN. If we use a broader criteria (i.e.
more than 30 kms) to count the number of competitors in a commercial area, this variable is
adjusted to the new definition of the dependent variable. Since land prices tend to be high
when the population density is high, this variable is expected to capture local fixed costs as-
sociated with the opening of new establishments, and we expect a negative effect on the
number of retail establishments. 24
The third cost variable is associated with the barriers created by regional legislation that
limit entry of new large retail establishments. These barriers can be viewed as a fixed cost
of entry for the retail outlets. In order to capture this cost we include the retail market regu-
lation indicator developed by Matea and Mora (2009) as an explanatory variable (see Table
2). Since regulation has increased over time we include both a variable measuring the regu-
lation level in 1997, REG97, and the difference between 1997 and 2006 of the two values
that Matea and Mora provide for their regulation indicator, DIFREG. 2560 LUIS OREA
As mentioned in Section 3 above, the Matea and Mora (2009) indicator is measured
at the autonomous region level, so both REG97 and DIFREG take the same value for all
commercial areas located in the same autonomous region. We expect negative parameters
for both variables. If these parameters are statistically significant we can conclude that
legal entry barriers have effectively deterred the creations of new hypermarkets and shop-
ping centers.
We also expect a different effect of REG97 and DIFREG for several reasons: i) the in-
crease in the regulation indicator captures different entry barriers than those captured in
REG97 that, in turn, might have either a higher or a lower deterrence effect than previous
regulation; and ii) the effect on entry of the barriers promulgated in the last years is not com-
pletely observed.
The dependent variable in our empirical models is the number of large retail establish-
ments, i.e. hypermarkets and shopping centers. As mentioned in the previous section, we in-
clude the stores located in and surrounding the main municipality of a particular commercial
area. The locations of all hypermarkets and shopping centers are obtained from the list of all
the shopping centers in Spain in 2007 (Directorio de Centros Comerciales) included in the
Anuario elaborated by La Caixa. 26 This directory provides information on the location of
each shopping center (namely the municipality and town each store belongs to), the store
selling area, and other facilities.
The La Caixa database also provides details about the composition of each commercial
area, including the distance of each municipality from the lead municipality of the commer-
cial area they belong to. This has allowed us to count the number of establishments located
in the main municipality of a particular commercial area and those located within a radius of
a certain number of kilometers. We construct two dependent variables using this informa-
tion. For the first, NUM30, we used the 30 kms criteria to count the number of competitors
in a commercial area. Since competition authorities note that the radius may be larger than
30 kms, in order to analyze the robustness of our results to the definition of the geographi-
cal market we have also used a second dependent variable, NUM40, where we have used the
40 kms criteria.
Since population, or its consumption capacity, is included as explanatory variables, the
parameter estimates of the other independent variables can be interpreted as a change in the
per capita number of establishments. Hence, another option, which is common in the liter-
ature, is to use a per capita measure for the dependent variable. In consequence, we have
also used the density of establishments (i.e. the number of large retail establishments divid-
ed by millions of inhabitants) as a dependent variable in order to analyze the robustness of
our results. 27
Finally, in order to check if regional regulation has effectively protected in-town shops
from competition and improved their market position, we also use as a dependent variable
the total number of in-town shops in the main municipality of the commercial area, IN-61 The effect of legal barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a local market approach
TOWN. This variable includes medium-size establishments (i.e. supermarkets) and small,
traditional, and specialized stores (such as bakeries, butchers, grocers, clothes wear shops,
shoe shops, etc.). We have also carried out our estimations by distinguishing among three
types of shops: i) supermarkets; ii) traditional food shops, and iii) non-food shops. The num-
ber of these types of shops yields three additional dependent variables: SUPER, TRAD-
FOOD, and NONFOOD.
Compared to the large retail establishments models two comments are in order. First, the
consumption capacity variable (CONSUM) and the occupation rate (OCURATE) in these
models refer only to the main municipality of the commercial area. Second, as a proxy of
fixed costs associated with the opening of new in-town shops we have used in these models
the real estate price (measured in €/m2) published by the Spanish Ministry of Housing for
each province, REPRICE. Therefore, we expect a negative effect of this variable on the num-
ber of in-town shops.
A summary of the descriptive statistics for the above variables are shown in Table 3.
This table describes the demographic characteristics and market structures that we observe
in our 73 local markets.
Table 3
RETAIL MARKET REGULATION LEVEL BY REGION
Mean St. Dev Min Max
NUM30 6.0 13.9 0.0 113.0
NUM40 6.4 14.8 0.0 119.0
MUNPC 7.7 5.1 0.0 22.7
TRADFOOD 1563 2275 168 14415
SUPER 127 191 11 1255
NONFOOD 3128 5198 264 37205
INTOWN 5153 8118 465 56278
REG97 37.9 3.6 32.0 45.0
DIFREG 12.2 9.8 –7.0 35.0
CONSUM (Main municipality) 492 907 35 6780
CONSUM (Commercial Area) 1432 2328 52 15304
PROCON 37.6 12.1 13.2 67.3
POPCA 671 1070 26 7008
PROPOP 34.2 10.4 12.5 63.3
DISTANCE 27.3 11.6 4.9 59.3
OCURATE (Main municipality) 85.7 4.9 72.0 93.5
OCURATE (Commercial Area) 85.8 5.8 68.8 94.2
POPDEN 331.6 486.6 48.0 3381.9
RSPRICE 234.9 117.0 66.0 489.0
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the per capita number of large retail establish-
ments and the level of regional barriers of retail entry developed by Matea and Mora (2009).
This figure appears to indicate a decreasing relationship between the number of large com-
petitors and regulation. Our subsequent analysis will investigate whether this relationship is
robust to inclusion of additional covariates.62 LUIS OREA
6. Results
Several models have been estimated by OLS in order to check whether the parameter es-
timates are robust when different specifications of the basic model are estimated.
The results obtained for large retail establishments are presented in Table 4.
For all specifications of the dependent variable we reject the null hypothesis of no het-
eroskedasticity at the 5% percent level of significance using the Breusch-Pagan LM chi-
squared test. Although accounting for heteroskedasticity does not produce significant
changes in inference, we present hereafter the White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent t-ratios.
Based on the one-stop vs. top-up model of shopping behavior, we assume that demand
from one-stop shopping is unaffected by the demand from top-up shopping. This assumption
of independent demand for one-stop shopping allows us to estimate the entry model for large
stores independently from small stores and traditional shops, and thereby to investigate the
differential impact of regional regulation. 28
The basic model is MODEL 1. This model includes the consumption capacity of the over-
all commercial area as a demand driver but ignores other variables that control for demand
heterogeneity and cost differences. As expected, consumption capacity has a significant and
positive effect on the number of large retail outlets, indicating that market size, reflected both
in population and per capita purchasing power, is clearly an important determinant of market
structure (see, for instance, Manuszak and Moul, 2008). Regarding the barriers to entry vari-
ables, the estimations show that regional regulation in 1997 has affected the number of large
establishments located in a particular local retail market. 29 That is, REG97 has a negative and
Note: NUM30/POBCA = number of large retail establishments divided by millions of inhabitants.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































statistically significant coefficient, indicating that legal entry restrictions in 1997 have effec-
tively deterred the creation of new hypermarkets and shopping centers. However, the estimat-
ed coefficient of DIFREG is not statistically significant. This suggests that the increase of re-
gional barriers to entry for large retail establishments promoted in the last decade by Spain’s
autonomous regions has not deterred the creation of new establishments.
In order to check whether these results are robust to demand heterogeneity, we have ex-
tended the previous model by adding the proportion of consumption that correspond to the
main municipality (PROCON), and the average distance from the main municipality of all
municipalities of the commercial area (DISTANCE). As expected, while the effect of PRO-
CON on the number of retail establishments is positive and statistically significant, the ef-
fect of DISTANCE is negative and statistically significant. Moreover, in MODEL 2 the co-
efficient of DIFREG is statistically significant at just outside the 10% level, indicating that
the increase of regional barriers to entry in the last decade also seems to have had a deter-
rent effect on the creation of new establishments. Taken together these results suggest that
differences in demand structure among local markets should be controlled for when analyz-
ing the effect of regional barriers to entry on market structure.
In order to check whether these results are robust to cost differences among local markets,
the next model (MODEL 3) includes two cost drivers: the average occupancy rate of the com-
mercial area, OCURATE, and the population density of the main municipality and the munici-
palitieswhicharelessthan30kmsawayfromtheleadmunicipalityofthecommercialarea,POP-
DEN.Theeffectofbothvariablesonthenumberofretailestablishmentsisnegative,asexpected,
but not statistically significant. The results regarding the barriers to entry variables are almost in-
variant to the inclusion of both cost drivers, with the exception of DIFREG which is now statis-
tically significant at the 10% level. This again suggests that the increase of regional barriers to
entry has deterred the creation of new establishments. However, since the estimated coefficient
of REG97 is much higher than the estimated coefficient of DIFREG, we can conclude that the
additional regulation had, on average, a lower deterrent effect than the regulation in 1997.
The remaining models are modifications of MODEL 3. In MODEL 4 we use a broader
number of firms, NUM40, as a dependent variable. The main results are invariant to the use
of this 40 kms criteria to count the number of competitors in a commercial area. Our results
are therefore robust to the selection of a broader definition of the geographic market by
adding stores not included in NUM30.
In MODEL 5 we replace CONSUM by the population in the commercial area, POBCA,
and PROCON by the proportion of overall population corresponding to the main municipal-
ity, PROPOP. The main results are again invariant to the use of population and its geograph-
ical structure as demand drivers instead of consumption capacity which takes into account
both population and per capita purchasing power.
Similar conclusions apply to the last model, MODEL 6, where we use a per capita
measure for the dependent variable. Since the number of establishments has been normal-
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ized by the overall population of the commercial area, this variable is dropped from the set
of explanatory variables in this model. While the main results were almost the same and
both regulatory variables are negative and statistically significant, the goodness of fit of this
model is lower than that when we use the original number of establishments as the depend-
ent variable.
In summary, these estimations together seem to indicate that regional regulation has af-
fected the number of large establishments located in a particular local retail market, although
the increase of regional barriers to entry in the last decade had, on average, a lower deterrent
effect than the regulation in 1997.
A simulation exercise using the average value of the regulation variables allows us to
roughly calculate how the number of firms would change if the entry barriers were (par-
tially) eliminated. The average value of DIFREG is 12.2. Multiplying this by the estimat-
ed parameter value of 0.058 in MODEL 3 yields a value of 0.707. Thus, if the entry bar-
riers were reduced to the average 1997 level, the number of large retail establishments in
all the local markets would increase by less than one outlet. Given that the average num-
ber of hypermarkets and shopping centers in a commercial area is 6.04, this represents an
11.7% increase in the number of large competitors in a particular geographical market.
These results corroborate the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia’s statement that the
entry of large retail establishments was effectively deterred by regional regulation. This
reduced number of large retail establishments is likely to have harmed consumers’ welfare
due to the reduced variety of retail products and the higher prices they probably pay for
the products they purchase from nearby hypermarkets compared to those they would have
paid with free entry.
In order to check whether the barriers to entry in the local retail markets also reduced
the aggregate supply (variety) of retail products we have estimated several models using the
aggregate selling area of all the large retail establishments belonging to the same commer-
cial area as the dependent variable. The results were not conclusive. The parameter estimates
of both regulation variables using the narrower definition of the relevant geographic area
were not statistically significant at the standard levels of confidence. However, using the
broader definition of the relevant geographic market, the parameter associated with the reg-
ulation level in 1997 was negative and statistically significant. Thus, we cannot conclude
that the reduced number of large retail establishments has necessarily implied a reduction in
the aggregate selling area of hypermarkets and shopping centers. This lack of statistical sig-
nificance and the results in Table 4 would seem to suggest that regional regulation is restrict-
ing the entry of a large number of competitors in local markets, allowing the incumbent es-
tablishments to operate with a dimension that is large enough to impede the profitability of
new establishments.
Next we try to check whether regional regulation has effectively protected in-town shops
(i.e. supermarkets, bakeries, butchers, grocers, clothes wear shops, shoe shops, etc.) from
competition and improved their market position. To this end we have estimated several mod-66 LUIS OREA
els where the number of in-town shops in the main municipality of the commercial area 30 is
explained using the explanatory variables CONSUM, OCURATE, RSPRICE, and the two
regulation variables, REG97 and DIFREG. 31 Based on the one-stop vs. top-up model of
shopping behavior, we assume in our estimations that the decision to enter into the small
store format takes the number of large stores as given, in line with the assumption that these
firms compete over residual demand after one-stop shopping. Hence, in estimating the re-
sulting entry model for supermarkets and traditional stores we also include the number of
large establishments, NUM30, as an explanatory variable. The parameter estimates are
shown in Table 5.
Table 5
PARAMETER ESTIMATES. IN-TOWN SHOPS
Dependent variable
INTOWN INTOWN TRADFOOD TRADFOOD
Coef. t-robust Coef. t-robust Coef. t-robust Coef. t-robust
Constant 1734.161 0.863 4270.519 3.284 303.458 0.323 1584.416 1.954
REG97 118.971 2.014 24.502 0.792 58.230 1.732 10.519 0.482
DIFREG 13.236 0.936 1.541 0.195 12.372 1.781 6.466 1.231
CONSUM 8.956 16.339 12.295 11.251 2.453 9.626 4.140 11.890
OCURATE –62.511 –2.662 –53.903 –2.428 –25.574 –1.720 –21.227 –1.468
RSPRICE –1.299 –1.780 –0.505 –0.896 –0.491 –1.198 –0.091 –0.248
NUM30 –228.006 –3.397 –115.152 –5.109
R-squared 0.9884 0.9939 0.9554 0.9725
Observations 73 73 73 73
Br./Pagan Heter. test (d.f.) 371.7 (5) 100.7 (6) 186.0 (5) 52.3 (6)
Dependent variable
SUPER SUPER NONFOOD NONFOOD
Coef. t-robust Coef. t-robust Coef. t-robust Coef. t-robust
Constant 186.147 2.268 263.867 4.811 419.892 0.378 1455.398 2.165
REG97 5.015 2.506 2.120 1.899 43.763 1.556 5.195 0.313
DIFREG 0.309 0.588 –0.050 –0.145 -0.091 –0.012 –4.865 –1.120
CONSUM 0.207 11.260 0.309 6.579 5.751 22.799 7.114 9.038
OCURATE –4.064 –4.587 –3.800 –4.922 –18.324 –1.609 –14.809 –1.366
RSPRICE –0.027 –0.698 –0.003 –0.094 –0.893 –2.524 –0.569 –2.070
NUM30 –6.987 –2.430 –93.087 –1.985
R-squared 0.9726 0.9817 0.9925 0.9948
Observations 73 73 73 73
Br./Pagan Heter. test (d.f.) 262.9 (5) 87.7 (6) 302.6 (5) 209.4 (6)
Note: CONSUM and OCURATE refer to the main municipality of the commercial area.
The goodness of fit in all of the models is very high, with the demand driver CON-
SUM being the main explanatory variable, having a positive and statistically significant
coefficient. 32 The occupancy rate coefficient also has the correct sign and is statistically
significant. The real estate price coefficient is also negative, but only statistically signif-
icant for non-food shops. When the number of large stores is included it has a negative
and statistically significant effect on the number of overall in-town shops and on the
number of each type of these shops. It is worth noting that the inclusion of the number of
large stores not only increases the goodness of fit of all models but also yields a drastic67 The effect of legal barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a local market approach
reduction in the Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test, indicating that the main source of
heteroskedasticity is the presence of large competitors. In accordance with the parameter
estimates of the in-town shops model, one new large establishment located in or near the
main municipality reduces the number of in-town shops by 4.4%. The relative effect of
an additional large retail establishment varies, however, from one type of shop to anoth-
er. The traditional food shops are those most affected by the opening of a new large es-
tablishment, with a reduction of 7.4%, followed by supermarkets (5.5%) and non-food
stores (2.9%).
When the number of large establishments is included, the effect of both regulation vari-
ables is not statistically different from zero except for supermarkets, where REG97 has a
positive effect. This result indicates that regional regulation has not limited the number of
supermarkets and traditional shops. Similar results were obtained by Griffith and Harmgart
(2008) in their analysis of the UK grocery retail industry, wherethey only found a statistical-
ly significant (negative) impact of planning regulation for the very big stores (over 30,000
sq ft). On the other hand, the above results also indicate that neither of the regulation vari-
ables are capturing regional-specific cost common to both large and small stores which have
nothing to do with regulation costs. If both regulation variables were correlated with com-
mon cost not observed by the econometrician, we would expect a negative impact for both
large and small stores. However, we have only found a negative impact in our entry models
for large stores.
The negative values of NUM30 together with the negative effect of regulation bar-
riers on the number of large establishments suggest that regional regulation has indirect-
ly protected in-town stores from competition. In order to measure the magnitude of this
effect we can use the estimated coefficients of REG97 in the models where the number
of large competitors has been dropped from the equation. These restrictive models are
misspecified because a significant explanatory variable has been dropped. However,
since we have found that REG97 reduces the number of large establishments, if NUM30
is dropped from the model the new coefficient of REG97 measures the decrease in the
number of in-town shops resulting from abolishing the regional entry barriers to large
establishments. Once NUM30 is dropped from the model the coefficient of REG97 is al-
ways positive and statistically significant for in-town shops, supermarkets, traditional
food shops, and non-food shops. Hence, we can conclude that regional regulation in
1997 has effectively protected in-town shops from competition and improved their mar-
ket position. We can catch some feeling about the magnitude of this protection if we
compare the average regulation level in 1997 with the minimum level that corresponds
to Madrid. In particular, if we multiply 118.9 (the coefficient on REG97) by 6 (the av-
erage level of REG97 minus the level in Madrid) we get a 13.8% increase in the num-
ber of in-town shops due to over-regulation in 1997. Note, however, that DIFREG is not
statistically significant in MODEL 4, indicating that the increase in regulation over the
last decade has not yielded a significant protection of in-town stores. If we split the in-
town stores into supermarkets, traditional food shops, and non-food shops we get simi-
lar results, though the degree of protection varies among types of stores. The shops most68 LUIS OREA
favored by over-regulation in 1997 are traditional food shops and supermarkets, with re-
spective increases of 22.3% and 23.7% in the number of shops. For traditional food
shops, DIFREG is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that this type of
shops have also been better off with the increase in regulation during the last decade.
Non-food shops have also benefitted from over-regulation in 1997, though their number
would have increased by only 8.4%.
7. Conclusions and future agenda
Recent studies have shown that barriers to entry for large retail establishments promot-
ed by Spain’s autonomous regions have been increased in the last decade. In this study we
try to test whether the entry of large retail establishments was effectively limited by region-
al regulation and whether regional regulation effectively protected traditional shops from
competition and improved their market share.
Our results corroborate the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia’s statement that
the entry of large retail establishments was effectively deterred by regional regulation. If
the entry barriers were reduced to the average level in 1997, the number of large retail es-
tablishments in all local markets would increase by at least 11.7%. Although the results
are not conclusive, it seems that regional regulation has not only restricted the entry of a
large number of competitors in local markets but also allowing the incumbent establish-
ments to operate with a dimension that is large enough to impede the profitability of new
establishments. The final effect on consumers’ welfare of regional retail barriers to entry
will depend, however, on the incumbents’ market power, the cost efficiencies associated
with firms’ size, the degree to which these cost efficiencies are translated to consumers
(i.e. the cost-pass-through rate) and the utility from increasing the one-stop-shopping op-
portunities.
Finally, we also have found that traditional shops have not been limited by regional regu-
lation. On the contrary, this regulation have effectively protected in-town shops from compe-
tition and improved their market position, increasing the number of in-town shops, formed by
traditional food shops, supermarkets and non-food retailers by 13.8%.
In order to measure incumbents’ market power and to further quantify the economic im-
pact of regional retail barriers to entry we are extending our research by carrying out a price-
concentration analysis. This model explains the variation in a particular price by variables re-
lated to cost, demand and market structure, and a set of dummy variables that allow the
intercept to differ among relevant groups of observations. The change in the number of com-
petitors estimated in the present paper together with the parameters of a price-concentration
equation would allow us to compute the effect on prices of raising entry barriers to large re-
tail establishments by autonomous regions. To achieve this objective we are collecting firm-
level price data from the Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (OCU), i.e. the Spanish
consumers’ association.69 The effect of legal barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a local market approach
Notes
1. See Matea and Mora (2007). An extended version of this study, which analyses the same issues that are ad-
dressed in the present paper using regional data, has recently been published as a working paper of the Banco
de España (See Matea and Mora, 2009).
2. Before September 2007 the Spanish Competition Authority was formed by the Tribunal de Defensa de la
Competencia (TDC) and the Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia (SDC). Both institutions later merged into
one which is called Comisión Nacional de la Competencia (CNC).
3. Completion of the internal market in services is viewed as a major building block and contributor to higher
growth and employment in the European Union, as services account for 60-70 % of economic activity in the
EU Member States and about the same percentage of jobs. Not all the services sectors are affected by the EU
Services Directive, but just a selection of them that amount up to around 40%.
4. See the assessment carried out by Djankov et al. (2002) based on survey measures of product market com-
petition, or the study of the margin of operating income over sales carried out by Cincera and Galgau
(2005).
5. As pointed out by the author, this result is likely a consequence of the (aggregated) price indices used in the
study, which may hide the effect of barriers on individual prices. He suggested assessing the effect of barriers
using series of individual prices, which were unavailable in his study.
6. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) have found that barriers to entry have effectively deterred the creation (and
increased the average size) of new firms in Europe.
7. The price indices were constructed by the Spanish consumers’ association, OCU (Organización de Consumi-
dores y Usuarios), and published in its monthly report. We also report the average national index as a bench-
mark. This allows us to isolate the competition effects from changes in the definition of the bundle of prod-
ucts over time and other common factors.
8. This picture is not easily extended to other local markets where there was an entry of a large retail establish-
ment due to either a lack of information on the prices of the incumbent establishments or to the fact that entry
happened at the beginning or at the end of the sample period.
9. One characteristic of this framework is that it ignores the dynamics of the entry process. Moreover, firms are
not symmetric (in terms of size, reputation, quality, etc.). Modelling decisions when both entry decisions are
discrete and firms are asymmetric is a complex task. Mazzeo (2002a) relaxed this symmetry assumption by
introducing different types of products (or firms), conditioning the analysis on the number of entering firms
of each type. However, Einav (2007) pointed out that the main restriction still remains (e.g. all potential en-
trants are ex-ante identical), and extending Mazzeo’s model to more than two or three types is computation-
ally unfeasible.
10. The estimated change in the number of competitors together with the parameters of a price-concentration
equation (that we are estimating in an ongoing paper) would allow us to compute the effect on prices of rais-
ing entry barriers to large retail establishments by autonomous regions.
11. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2002) extended this insight and studied the implications of increased market size
on the average size of firms in the market. In contrast to Bresnahan and Reiss, they find that this competitive
effect persists even when there are a large number of firms in the market.
12. It should be noted, however, that the empirical exercise is carried out for just 73 observations and several in-
dependent variables.
13. Smith (2006) labeled these as secondary stores and defined those where the consumer spends the greatest
weekly amount as primary stores.
14. Other papers that also make this distinction are Mazzeo (2002b), and Griffith and Harmgart (2008).70 LUIS OREA
15. This assumption allows us to estimate a recursive model where no instrumental variables are required. Oth-
erwise, we should estimate a system of equations where the number of different store formats (hypermarkets,
supermarkets, specialized shops, etc.) is the dependent variable in some equations and the (endogenous) ex-
planatory variables in other equations. Because of the simultaneous determination of the number of different
store formats, the number of other store formats may be correlated with the error term, causing bias in the es-
timated parameters. An effective two-stage least-squares procedure relies on instruments that affect some store
formats but not other formats. This makes it very difficult to address this endogeneity problem with the infor-
mation available.
16. This section is mainly inspired by Hoffmaister (2006), and Matea and Mora (2007).
17. Following Djankov et al. (2002), Hoffmaister (2006) used this approach to construct an ordinal measure of the
barriers to retail trade in the Spanish regions.
18. See the Promodes/Carrefour, Alcosto/Caprabo and Caprabo/Eroski cases.
19. Claycombe (2000) used commuting variables to estimate a price-concentration model. He found that con-
centration has a strong positive correlation with furniture and clothing prices in the US Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas.
20. This is the approach followed, for instance, by Manuszak and Moul (2008) and the FTC to define the relevant
geographical market in the Staples/Office Depot merger case. Using confidential documents from the parties,
the FTC concluded that metropolitan areas and regions arguably outside of a metropolitan area formed the rel-
evant market. See also Claycombe (2000).
21. A recent example of the difficulties that arise when defining the relevant geographical market in the retail in-
dustry can be found in the remedies imposed by the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia to DIA in the ac-
quisition of PLUS. (http://www.cncompetencia.es/ControlConcentraciones/C-000107INFWEB.pdf).
22. See www.anuarieco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com/java/X?cgi=caixa.le_menuGeneral.pattern for more details
on this database.
23. This variable was constructed using the unemployment rate with respect to the working population provided
by La Caixa, whose definition is quite similar to that used by the Survey of the Working Population (EPA).
24. In order to capture the fixed costs associated with the opening of new establishments in some industries, Bres-
nahan and Reiss (1991) used the price of the cultivated land. De Juan (2006) also used the housing price as a
proxy for the fixed cost of bank branches.
25. As pointed out by one of the referees, this indicator should refer to 2006 (which is a yearly average) because
the information included in the data set provided by La Caixa refers to January 2007.
26. This list includes small hypermarkets that might not be affected by the regional regulation on large establish-
ments. This type of hypermarkets, however, only represents a 3.7% of all establishments included in the Di-
rectorio, and on average they were opened quite before the Spanish law that regulates the retail sector came
into effect in 1996.
27. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
28. From a theoretical point of view this assumption implies that the number of small supermarkets and tradi-
tional shops should not be included as an explanatory variable in the model. From an empirical perspective,
this assumption also implies that the number of small supermarket and traditional shops is an endogenous
variable as these firms compete over residual demand after one-stop shopping and their number thus depends
in turn on the number of large stores. Since the reduction in large stores attributed to higher regional regula-
tion yields an increase in the number of small stores (see the entry models we estimate for small stores), the
inclusion of this endogenous variable will capture part of the negative impact of regional regulation on the
number of large retail stores. However, even though the parameters are likely to be biased, both regulation
variables are still negative and statistically significant when the number of small supermarkets and tradition-
al stores is included in the model.71 The effect of legal barriers to entry in the Spanish retail market: a local market approach
29. One might think that both regulation variables could be endogenous if the decision to introduce regulation
depends on the presence of hypermarkets and shopping centers. However, we expect that this is not a rele-
vant issue in this application due to the fact that regulation variables are defined at a regional level, and each
region includes several local markets. That is, unobserved demand and cost shocks that affect the number
of large establishments in a particular local market do not necessarily determine the regional regulation
variables.
30. We focus our analysis in main municipalities as most large establishments are located in or nearby the main
municipality, and hence we expect a stronger effect on in-town shops in the main municipality than in farther
municipalities of the commercial area.
31. Recall that CONSUM and OCURATE only refer here to the main municipality, whereas they referred to the
overall commercial area in the large retail establishments models.
32. We arrive at the same conclusion if we use population as the demand driver instead of consumption capacity.
Using the former variable notably reduces the R-squared and hence the predictive capacity of the estimated
model.
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Resumen
Estudios recientes realizados sobre el sector de comercio minorista en España han constatado el cre-
ciente número de barreras que en la última década limitan o desincentivan la apertura de grandes su-
perficies comerciales. Usando datos a nivel local, en el presente trabajo se contrasta si la (prolífica) re-
gulación regional de comercio minorista ha tenido un efecto significativo sobre el número de grandes
centros comerciales en España y si dicha regulación ha protegido efectivamente al pequeño comercio,
localizado tradicionalmente en los casos urbanos de las ciudades. En este trabajo se concluye que si las
barreras a la entrada de grandes superficies se redujeran a los niveles de 1997, el número de grandes
establecimientos aumentaría en un 11.7%. Asimismo se encuentra que la regulación regional de co-
mercio minorista ha permitido mejorar la posición del pequeño comercio tradicional en torno a un
13.8%.
Palabras clave: Barreras a la entrada, comercio minorista, regulación.
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